H & H Warehouse and Continental Western Insurance Company, petitioners, seek review of a final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) which concluded that claimant had sustained a compensable injury to his arm and awarded temporary disability benefits, medical benefits, and an amount for disfigurement. We affirm.
Petitioners argue that the employer is not liable under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) for the injury suffered by claimant. We disagree.
While claimant was at work, a door was suddenly and unexpectedly opened which startled him and caused him to hastily move his arm. At the hearing on his claim, claimant presented evidence that an undetected cancerous growth had undermined the strength of the humerus bone and that, as a result, his rapid arm movement in response to the door opening caused the bone to fracture.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that claimant had sustained a broken arm in the incident and stated further:
"Claimant's fractured humerus resulted from a combination of abnormal motion in response to a startling stimulus, and the pre-existing weakness in the bone resulting from the cancer condition."
Accordingly, he found claimant entitled to workers' compensation benefits. That order was affirmed by the Panel.
Initially, we note that both petitioners and claimant argue the Panel improperly applied the positional risk doctrine in deciding this matter. We agree that the Panel improperly used this doctrine in affirming the determination of the ALJ, but we nonetheless affirm the Panel's decision because we conclude it reached the right result, albeit for incorrect reasons. Furthermore, we note that the ALJ did not rely on the positional risk doctrine in reaching his decision.
The positional risk analysis is applicable when the cause of an event is neither personal to the claimant nor distinctly associated with employment. In re Question Submitted by U.S. Court of Appeals, 759 P.2d 17 (Colo.1988). This doctrine has been applied to situations where stray bullets, rapists, and mentally deranged persons have caused injuries to employees while at work. See 1 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law §§ 10.22 and 11.11(b) (1990). Under such circ*mstances, the only connection of employment with the injury is that the obligations of work placed the employee in a particular place at a particular time when he was injured by some "neutral force." "Neutral force" means one that is neither personal to the claimant nor distinctly associated with the employment. In re Question Submitted by U.S. Court of Appeals, supra; Patel v. Thomas, 793 P.2d 632 (Colo.App.1990); 1 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 6.10 (1990).
In our view, the sudden opening of a door at work is an event associated with employment. If claimant had been physically struck by the door as it was opened and had suffered a fracture from the door striking him, the related injury would be indisputably compensable under the Act. See In re Question Submitted by U.S. Court of Appeals, supra. Here, the work place door caused a response which in turn caused the fracture; this does not change the fact that the causative event (opening the door) was distinctly associated with claimant's employment. Hence, the positional risk analysis is inapplicable.
Petitioners next argue that claimant failed to prove the opening of the door was an event peculiar to his employment and that compensation should thus be denied. We disagree.
In Gates Rubber Co. v. Industrial Commission, 705 P.2d 6 (Colo.App.1985), this court affirmed the denial of compensation to an employee who was injured from an idiopathic fall. We concluded that a level concrete floor did not present a special hazard because it was a condition found in many nonemployment locations.
Petitioners argue that the sudden opening of a door is not a special hazard of a particular employment. See Ramsdell v. Horn, 781 P.3d 150 (Colo.App.1989) (where employee fell from scaffold, injuries caused by fall are compensable as resulting from a special hazard of employment).
That argument fails here, however, because it was the sudden opening of the door, rather than any preexisting condition (e.g., dizziness, seizures), that was the initiating and precipitating cause of the injury. The existing disease of an employee does not disqualify a claim if the employment aggravates, accelerates, or combines with the disease or infirmity to produce the disability for which workers' compensation is sought. 1 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law Β§ 12.21 (1990). If, as here, a preexisting condition has weakened a limb so that it could be injured by a mishap which would probably not hurt a healthy arm, the employer is liable for benefits. Moore v. R.C. Can Co., 229 S.W.2d 272 (St. Louis Ct.App.1950).
Petitioners further contend that more than a startling event is required to hold an employer liable for benefits. They implicitly argue there must be a traumatic striking of a claimant before liability attaches. We disagree.
No statutory provision sets out such a requirement. Further, in Hanover Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 397 S.W.2d 904 (Tex.Civ.App.1965), the claimant injured his previously weakened back when, while in a squatting position, he turned to see who called to him. The court determined the injury was compensable because claimant's reason for turning was an incident of employment. See also International Vermiculite Co. v. Industrial...
